Us Arms Policies Towards the Shah's Iran by Stephen McGlinchey

Author:Stephen McGlinchey [McGlinchey, Stephen]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, General
ISBN: 9781317697084
Google: NqzAAwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 22538069
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2014-06-05T00:00:00+00:00

Iranian nuclear ambiguity

After the oil embargo and price shocks of late 1973 and early 1974, interest in alternative sources of energy surged worldwide, with nuclear energy seeming the most viable. As a signatory of the March 1970 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the US as a nuclear weapons nation was bound to not transfer nuclear weapons, nor assist other countries in developing their own nuclear weapons programmes. Concurrently, Iran as a non-nuclear signatory of the treaty was bound not to either receive or develop nuclear arms. The treaty sought to channel nuclear technology into civilian uses and to recognise the destabilising effect of further proliferation on the international community. Hence, Iran was keen to attain its NPT treaty rights to share in ‘the fullest possible exchange of scientific information’16 with nuclear states such as the US and France. The Shah vigorously pursued a nuclear energy cooperation deal with the US through 1974–76. With the Tehran agreement of May 1972 in mind, the only condition that Nixon had imposed on the Shah was that nuclear weapons were forbidden, recalling the obligations both nations had as signatories of the NPT. For that reason it appears surprising that during this period the Shah seemed to harbour a desire for an Iranian nuclear deterrent.

A National Intelligence Estimate on nuclear proliferation from August 1974 noted that Iran was ‘at least’ a decade away from a nuclear weapons programme – should they choose to develop one.17 The report was commissioned following India’s controversial first nuclear test, which had been done outside the bounds of the NPT. Iran was not part of the original brief but was incorporated in the drafting process due to remarks that the Shah had made to a French journalist in late June 1974. When asked if Iran would one day possess a nuclear weapon, the Shah replied: ‘… certainly, and sooner than is believed.’18 The Shah denied he had made those statements just one day later, after his words attracted high-level attention in an understandably sensitive Washington.19 Helms attempted to draw a line under the misunderstanding. He reported on 1 July that the Shah was ‘very upset’ at the international furore his words had caused. He also noted that the Shah had denied that the offending interview had even taken place and had reaffirmed Iran’s policy not to acquire nuclear weapons.20 Denying that an on-the-record interview had even occurred was a fanciful, and rather desperate, defence strategy by the Shah. The fact that Helms accepted this explanation without any critique is also another sign of the increasingly advocate-type role Helms was playing for the Shah. This had been evidenced with prior ambassadors, though Helms took the relationship much further. Together with Kissinger in the State Department, the two men resembled something of an unquestioning pro-Shah double act. With Kissinger at the helm in Foggy Bottom, Helms could rest assured that his cables would receive the highest level of attention. Any benefit of the doubt for the Shah’s dubious account of the nuclear statement would be warranted if this were but an isolated example.

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